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Abstract 
We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving 
non-cooperative games, giving rise to agreements which will, in general, differ 
from the Nash equilibrium of the constituent games.  
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1. Introduction 
  
 Since the seminal contributions by Nash (1950, 1953), bargaining models play a central role 
in the analysis of situations in which economic agents try to reach an agreement on the split of a 
certain asset. While there is a huge literature on the efficiency of equilibrium in different non-
cooperative games
1
, most of the bargaining literature
2
, in order to focus on the split of wealth 
among negotiating agents, takes as given the pie to be shared.  
                                                 
* G. Attanasi gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Chair « Georges Meyer » in Mathematical Economics at 
Jean-Jacques Laffont Foundation (TSE) and the French National Research Agency (ANR) through the project on « Fair 
Environmental Policies ». N. Georgantzís and A. García-Gallego acknowledge financial support by Bancaixa (P1 
1B2007-14) and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (SEJ2008/04636/ECON). N. Georgantzís gratefully 
acknowledges financial support by the Junta de Andalucía (P07-SEJ-03155) and the hospitality at LEM of University 
Paris II. 
 Corresponding author: 21 allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse. Email: attanasi@cict.fr . Phone: +33(0)561128713. 
1 Relevant references are Harsanyi (1961), Friedman (1971), Smale (1980) and Cubitt and Sugden (1994). 
2 While an exhaustive list of the relevant references is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning Harsanyi 
(1956, 1962), Sutton (1986) and Binmore (1987).  
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 However, bargaining processes may have other purposes, beyond the split of a pie. In this 
paper we illustrate the consequences of applying alternating proposal protocols as a way of solving 
non-cooperative games. From a technical point of view, the basic difference between our 
framework and that of bargaining over the split of a pie is that, in ours, two agents bargain about 
their strategies in a 2x2 game. Apart from the obvious departure from Rubinstein’s (1982) model in 
that the set of possible agreements
3
 is finite, in our setup, a confirmed agreement between 
bargaining agents concerns the pair of independent strategies in the constituent non-cooperative 
game. This fact increases by one the degrees of freedom and, thus, the dimension of the outcome 
space, allowing the use of bargaining with alternating proposals as a method of solving non-
cooperative games. 
 Assume that two players bargain over the strategy profile to play, given that each player 
knows the opponent’s set of possible strategies. Then, there is a constituent game whose execution 
leads to the two players’ final payoffs and a supergame whose actions in each bargaining period are 
proposals of strategies for the constituent game. Games with confirmed proposals are interactive 
strategic situations in which a player, in order to give official acceptance of a contract, must confirm 
his/her proposed strategy combined with the strategy chosen by his/her opponent.
4
 We deal here 
with constituent games with finite strategy spaces and show that, in the bargaining supergame built 
on them, the equilibrium outcome can be unique even though each player’s strategy space and the 
stages of the game itself are infinite. We call equilibrium confirmed agreement the corresponding 
equilibrium contract. 
 
 
2. The rules of the bargaining game  
  
 Throughout the paper, we assume that only two players are involved in the bargaining game 
and that they alternate proposals. We mainly focus on a specific family of games with confirmed 
proposals (GCP henceforth), those with chained proposals. That is, in the case of no confirmation 
by one player, the non confirmed strategy profile is taken as the new starting point for the 
subsequent negotiation. Thus, both players have the same power of confirmation and, except for the 
selection of the first mover at the beginning of the game, the rules of the game are symmetric. 
                                                 
3 For a formal treatment of this issue, see the insightful analysis by Muthoo (1991). 
4 The bargaining game can be a game with perfect or imperfect information and/or with complete or incomplete 
information. When information is incomplete, players can exploit the bargaining process to extract information on their 
opponent’s type through their proposals. 
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Let us denote by Sh the finite strategy space for player h (with ,h i j ) in the constituent 
game, i.e. the strategic situation whose players’ strategy profiles induce all the possible agreements 
of the GCP built on it. This is a bargaining supergame represented by a sequence of alternating 
proposals of the two players, which ends when a player confirms the proposal he/she made the 
previous stage in which he/she was active. By construction, the set of possible agreements of the 
GCP coincides with the set of outcomes of the constituent game, and the set of possible proposals 
of player h in the supergame coincides with the set of his/her strategies in the constituent game, Sh . 
Denote by t
hs  the strategy proposed by player h in stage t, with 1,2,...,t   . Suppose that player i 
(“she”) starts the bargaining supergame with player j (“he”). The sequence of alternating proposals 
is as follows: 
Stage 1. Player i proposes a certain strategy 1
i is S  to player j. Player i would actually play 
1
is  if (and only if) she would confirm this strategy after the reply of player j. 
Stage 2. Player j proposes strategy 2 j js S  to player i. This strategy would actually be 
played if (and only if) either i will confirm her previous strategy 1
is  
or j will confirm his proposal 2
js  
after the reply of player i. 
Stage 3. Player i chooses whether or not to confirm her previous strategy 1
is . If she confirms 
1
is ,  i.e. 
3 1i is s , then the bargaining process ends, through the sequence (
1 2 1, ,i j is s s ), with the 
confirmed agreement ( 1 2,i js s ) and the two players receive the payoffs corresponding to the strategy 
profile ( 1 2,i js s ) in the constituent game. If she does not confirm, i.e. she proposes a new strategy 
3 1i is s , the bargaining process continues with 
2
js  being player j’s proposal and 
3
is  
being player i’s 
reply to j’s proposal. 
Stage 4.  Player j chooses whether or not to confirm his previous strategy 
2
js . If he confirms 
2
js ,  i.e. 
4 2j js s , then the bargaining process ends, through the sequence (
2 3 2, ,j i js s s ), with the 
confirmed agreement ( 2 3,j is s ) and the two players receive the payoffs corresponding to the strategy 
profile ( 3 2,i js s ) in the constituent game. If he does not confirm, i.e. he proposes a new strategy 
4 2j js s , the bargaining process continues with 
3
is  being player i’s proposal and 
4
js  
being player j’s 
reply to i’s proposal. 
And so on and so forth. 
If no strategy profile is ever confirmed by either player, then the outcome is the 
disagreement event . Define with 
2 1( , )t th hf s s
 
  the outcome of the GCP when the agreement 
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2 1( , ) 
t t
h hs s  is confirmed in stage t, with 3,..., t . We assume that each player h’s preference 
relation hÍ  satisfies the following conditions:
5
  
(a) Disagreement is worse than any confirmed agreement:   h
2 1( , ) 
t t
h hf s s  for all  
2 1( , )   
t t
h h h hs s S S  and for all 3,..., t .  
(b)  Patience: 
1 2 2 1( , ) ( , )t t t th h h h hf s s f s s
    
   for all t t , with , 3,...,  t t . 
(c)  Stationarity: 
2 1 2 1( , ) ( , )t t t th h h h hf s s f s s
   
 Í  if and only if 
2 1 2 1( , ) ( , )t t t th h h h hf s s f s s
      
 Í , for all t t ,   
with , 3,...,  t t . 
 We refer to the extensive game with perfect information thus defined as the (bargaining) 
game with confirmed chained proposals. In the following section, we analyze the GCP version of 
some famous interactive strategic situations, extensively analyzed both in the theoretical and in the 
experimental literature. First, we show two examples in which the constituent game is a 2x2 static 
game. Then, we concentrate on three cases where the constituent game is dynamic. 
 
 
3. Confirmed agreements in standard two-player games 
 
3.1 Static Constituent Game 
 
 Consider the GCP version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). This means that the constituent 
game is a standard PD and the bargaining game built on it is an infinite supergame with perfect and 
complete information. The sets of players’ feasible proposals in the GCP coincide with their sets of 
actions in the constituent game: Si = Sj =  ,Cooperate Defect , henceforth  , .C D
 
Figure 1, with 
a c d z   , shows the simultaneous-move constituent game and all possible agreements of the 
bargaining (super)game with confirmed proposals one can build on it. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Payoff matrix of the PD game 
                                                 
5 Conditions (i) and (iii) characterize also Rubinstein (1982), while in Rubinstein’s model time is valuable and a 
discount factor is introduced accordingly. 
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The constituent game has the profile ( , )D D  as equilibrium in dominant actions. The same 
equilibrium outcome would be found in the standard two-stage game
6
, where one of the two players 
moves first and the other observes his/her “proposal” before choosing his/her own.  
Let us now calculate the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the GCP version of the PD 
game. Throughout the paper, we focus on subgame perfect equilibria in weakly dominant strategies: 
we assume that in equilibrium both players bargaining in the GCP choose a strategy that weakly 
dominates all the others. 
Observe Figure 2. The payoff structure of the bargaining game is the same as in the PD in 
Figure 1. The first of the two payoffs always refers to player i, as in the constituent game. Each tree 
branch marked in bold indicates a partial history within the equilibrium path. One main result is: 
 
 
 
Figure 2. PD with confirmed proposals 
 
 Proposition 1. The PD with chained confirmed proposals has a unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium, inducing the cooperative confirmed agreement in the first stage in which a player is 
allowed to confirm his/her proposal. 
 Proof. Let us consider the infinite game in Figure 2. The tree branches belonging to the 
equilibrium path are part of a pair of weakly dominant strategies. More precisely, each player’s 
strategy leads to the following result: the payoff obtained by the player through confirming at a 
                                                 
6 The version without bargaining and without confirmation. 
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stage t equals the highest payoff he can get by continuing the game, and for any ˆ t t  this highest 
payoff can be obtained only by confirming the same agreement confirmed at t. Observe that in 
Figure 2 (first 7 stages of the game) there are four decision nodes where a player can confirm the 
agreement yielding him/her a, his/her highest payoff possible. At stage t = 4, after the non-terminal 
history ( , , )D D C , player j can get a by choosing D, hence confirming his most preferred 
agreement. If, instead of confirming, player j chooses to continue the game, he can get, in any 
subgame in the continuation game, at most a payoff of a and only by confirming the same 
agreement he could already confirm at stage t = 4. Therefore, for player j confirming ( , )D C  at 
stage t = 4 weakly dominates continuing the game. The same holds for player i at stage t = 3, after 
history ( , )D C , and at stage t = 5 after history ( , , , )C D D C ; and for player j at stage t = 6 after 
history ( , , , , )C C D D C . Therefore, each player’s equilibrium strategy prescribes confirming the 
favourable asymmetric agreement whenever possible. At the same time, in order to prevent the 
opponent from doing the same, each player’s equilibrium strategy prescribes confirming also the 
agreement ( , )D D  whenever possible. This leads both players to propose D in each stage t every 
time at least one of the two players has proposed D in at least a t t  and to propose C otherwise. 
This leads to the terminal history ( , , )C C C . ■ 
Thus, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, player i starts by proposing 
strategy C to player j, who counter-proposes strategy C. Then, player i confirms strategy C, such 
that the constituent game strategy profile (C, C) is the (unique) confirmed agreement. This is 
reached already in stage t = 3, after the first interaction among players takes place.  
Consider now the GCP version of the Battle of Sexes (BS). The set of players’ feasible 
proposals
7
 is Si = Sj =  ,Opera Football , henceforth  , .O F  Figure 3 shows the one-shot 
constituent game and, also, all the possible agreements of the bargaining GCP one can build on it. 
Parameters are such that  1 2 3 4max , , ,a b c c c c  .  
 
 
Figure 3. Payoff matrix of the BS game 
 
                                                 
7 Which coincides with the set of players’ actions in the constituent game. 
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 The constituent game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: ( , )O O  and ( , )F F . In the 
standard two-stage dynamic version of the game, the player moving first
8
 has an advantage. 
Observe now Figure 4, which shows the BS with confirmed proposals for the case in which player i 
is the first mover. Each tree branch marked in bold indicates a partial history inside the equilibrium 
path; if the active player in a stage is indifferent between two or more proposals inside the 
equilibrium path, the equilibrium tree branches in that stage are identified with dotted bold lines.  
Observe that, surprisingly, there is a first-mover disadvantage: the unique equilibrium confirmed 
agreement coincides with the Nash equilibrium of the constituent game which is preferred by player 
j. 
 
Figure 4. BS with confirmed proposals 
  
 Proposition 2. The BS with chained confirmed proposals has a unique equilibrium 
confirmed agreement, involving players’ coordination on the constituent game equilibrium 
favourable to the second mover. 
 Proof. The game ends with the confirmation of the strategy profile (F, F), whatever is player 
i’s initial proposal. In each of the two subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies, j replies to i’s 
first proposal by indicating the opposite proposal (F if O and O if F). By doing that, j obliges player 
i to propose the same action already proposed by him (otherwise, i would confirm her initial action 
and would get 
1c b  
or 
3c b ). If this action is F, then j confirms F and gets his highest payoff 
possible. If instead this action is O, then j proposes F and i finds convenient to propose F, since, 
otherwise, she would obtain 
1c b ; then j confirms F and gets his highest payoff possible. 
Therefore, in the first stage player i is indifferent between her two possible proposals. ■ 
                                                 
8 In fact, this is equivalent to a commitment. 
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 Thus, in the BS with confirmed proposals the second mover is able to confirm the 
coordinating equilibrium outcome of the constituent game more favourable to him. 
 
3.2 Dynamic Constituent Game 
 
 When the constituent game is dynamic, the confirmed proposal structure can be built by 
using the strategic form of the constituent game. The set of strategies of each player in the 
constituent game corresponds to the set of possible proposals in the corresponding GCP.  
Consider, for example, the Trust Game (TG). In the constituent game player i (the truster) 
chooses whether to Trust (T) or to Do not trust (D) player j (the trustee). In case i trusts j, total 
profits are higher. In that case, j would decide whether to Grab (G) or to Share (S) the higher 
profits. The strategic form of the game in Figure 5, where x
 
:“x if T”, with ,x G S , and 
0  i ic d z , 0  j ja c d ,   i ja z c c , represents all possible agreements of the bargaining 
GCP built on this dynamic game.
9
 
 
 
Figure 5. Payoff matrix of the TG 
 
 In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the constituent game, i does not trust j, while 
the latter would choose to grab if i had trusted him in the first place.  
 Given players’ role asymmetries in the constituent game, the resulting GCP involves two 
possible versions: one in which the truster in the constituent game (i) is the first mover of the 
bargaining sequence, and one in which the trustee in the constituent game (j) is the first mover of 
the bargaining sequence. In this last case, j begins the GCP by announcing his intention to grab or 
to share the higher total profit in case i would trust him. The two versions of the TG with confirmed 
proposals are represented in Figure 6.a and 6.b respectively. 
                                                 
9 Notice that, in order for j to confirm an agreement, he has to re-propose the same strategy in two subsequent stages in 
which he is active. According to this rule, for example ( , , )S T G  is not a terminal history of the GCP, even though both 
strategy profiles ( , )T S  and ( , )T G  induce the same terminal history in the constituent game. 
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Figure 6. TG with confirmed proposals, with i (Figure 6.a) or j (Figure 6.b) as first mover. 
 
 For the two GCP in Figure 6, the following result holds. 
 
 Proposition 3. The TG with chained confirmed proposals has a unique equilibrium 
confirmed agreement, the cooperative one. This agreement is immediately confirmed by the first 
mover in the GCP. 
 Proof. Given that both players follow strategies that are weakly dominant, in both GCP in 
figure 6, at each stage t each player would: (1) confirm his/her most preferred agreement if he/she is 
given the possibility in that stage; (2) confirm agreements other than his/her most preferred if: (2.1) 
in some stage ˆ t t  (with ˆ t ) of the equilibrium continuation path, his/her opponent will confirm 
an agreement not better for him/her than the one he/she could confirm in t; (2.2) by not confirming 
in t, neither (1) nor (2.1) applies to any stage t + k, with 1,..., k , and the best agreement he/she 
could confirm when he/she is active in the continuation game is the same he/she could confirm in 
stage t. When the first mover is player i, in stage 3 she would confirm ( , )T S because of (1). She 
would confirm also ( , )D G  because of (2.1), and ( , )D S  because of (2.2). Instead, she would not 
confirm ( , )T G , given that none of the above mentioned cases applies. Hence, she would propose D 
after history ( , )T G . In stage 4, after ( , , )T G D , player j is indifferent between confirming the 
agreements ( , )D G  and proposing S. In both cases the payoffs are ( , )i jd d , since, if he proposes S, 
in the subsequent stage, player i would confirm ( , )D S  because of (2.2) (as we have previously 
seen after history ( , )D S ). Thus, the subgame perfect equilibrium path is ( , , )T S T , with i 
confirming  the agreement ( , )T S in stage 3. When the first mover is player j, in equilibrium he 
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confirms the same agreement in stage 3. This follows from the fact that in stage 3 he would confirm 
the agreement ( , )T G because of (1), ( , )T S because of (2.1) and he is indifferent between 
confirming or not the agreements ( , )D G and ( , )D S  because of (2.2) (as we have already seen 
when the first mover is the player i, after history (T,G,D)).■  
Notice that, as in the example of the BS, in both versions of the TG with confirmed 
proposals, the second mover reciprocates in stage 2 the first-mover’s proposal: he/she cooperates if 
the first-mover’s proposal is cooperative ( S  if T and T if S , respectively) and does not cooperate 
otherwise (G  if D and D if G , respectively).  
Consider now the dynamic Entry Game (EG). In the constituent game i (the potential 
entrant) chooses whether to Enter (E) or to Stay Out (S) of the market, with j (the incumbent) 
deciding whether to Accommodate (A) or Fight (F) if the entrant decides to enter. The strategic 
form of the game in Figure 7, where x
 
:“x if E”, with ,x A F , and 0a d z   , represents all 
possible agreements of the bargaining GCP built on this dynamic game. In the unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium of the constituent game, i’s entry takes place, with j accommodating it. 
 
 
Figure 7. Payoff matrix of the EG 
 
 Instead, in all subgame perfect equilibria of the correspondent GCP the entrant stays out. 
The two possible versions of the EG with confirmed proposals are represented in Figure 8. The first 
version, in Figure 8.a, represents the case in which player i, the potential entrant in the constituent 
game, moves first in the corresponding GCP. In the second version - Figure 8.b - player j, the 
incumbent in the constituent game, is the first mover.  
 For both GCP in Figure 8, the following result holds. 
 
 Proposition 4. The EG with chained confirmed proposals has two payoff-equivalent 
confirmed agreements, which involve the entrant to stay out. 
 Proof.  For the version of the game in Figure 8.a, where the first mover is player i, the 
proposition can be proved using the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 4. Notice that in 
the two GCP (Figure 4 and Figure 8.a) a player h (with ,h i j ) has the same equilibrium strategy: j 
replies to i’s “kind” (“unkind”) proposal by indicating the “unkind” (“kind”) proposal. By doing 
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that, j obliges player i to propose in stage 3 the action she did not propose in stage 1. And so on and 
so forth. The only difference with respect to the BS is that in the EG, after history ( , )S A , player i is 
indifferent between confirming this agreement and proposing E, because condition (2.1) (see proof 
of Proposition 3) applies. Thus, besides the agreement ( , )S F , also ( , )S A  is an equilibrium 
agreement, equivalent in payoff to ( , )S F . More precisely, if player i starts the bargaining process, 
there are three equilibrium terminal histories: ( , , , )E F S F , ( , , , , , )S A E F S F  and ( , , )S A S . When 
the first mover is player j (Figure 8.b), there are two equilibrium terminal histories: ( , , , , )A E F S F  
and ( , , )A S A . This follows from the fact that: each player always confirm agreements leading to 
his/her highest payoff possible, i.e. ( , )d d  for player i and 0( , )a  for player j; players’ optimal 
behavior after history ( , )A E  in Figure 8.a is the same as after history ( , , )S A E  in Figure 8.b;  after 
history ( )A , player i is indifferent between E and S because condition (2.1) (see proof of 
Proposition 3) applies ■  
  
 
Figure 8. EG with confirmed proposals, with i (Figure 8.a) or j (Figure 8.b) as first mover. 
 
 Therefore, in both GCP in Figure 8, there is an equilibrium confirmed agreement in which 
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agreement  ( , )S A  or she will no longer be able to confirm any agreement at all; if she is not the first 
mover (Figure 8.b), in equilibrium she will never be able to confirm any agreement. Notice that, in 
the GCP version of the EG, the following properties hold: 
(i) only two agreements can be confirmed in equilibrium; 
(ii) the two equilibrium confirmed agreements are payoff-equivalent;  
(iii) both of them are Pareto efficient; 
(iv) none of them is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the constituent game;  
(v) in one of the two equilibrium agreements player i’s strategy is not even a best reply in the 
constituent game; 
(vi) the second mover in the constituent game (j) is able to benefit from the confirmed proposals 
structure, getting his highest payoff possible; 
(vii) in the equilibrium path, player i is indifferent between her two possible proposals in the first 
stage in which she is active; 
(viii) properties (i) – (vii) hold independently of whether the player is assigned the role of first 
mover in the GCP. 
We show below that the same features emerge when analyzing the confirmed proposals version of a 
totally different strategic interaction setting: the Ultimatum Game (UG). In the constituent game, i 
(proposer) can offer a fair (F) or unfair (U) division to j (respondent); the latter, after having 
received i’s offer, may either accept (A) or reject (R). In the confirmed proposal version of this 
game, the set of i’s possible proposals coincides with her actions in the constituent game, while the 
set of j’s possible proposals coincides with his strategies in the constituent game, i.e. Sj = 
 , , ,AA AR RA RR , with x
 
y :“x if F and y if U”, with , , .x y A R The strategic form of the UG in 
Figure 9 (with 0)a f b   , represents all the possible agreements of the bargaining supergame 
built on this game.
10
 
 
 
Figure 9. Payoff matrix of the UG 
                                                 
10 Recall that given that confirmation is achieved through re-proposal of the same strategy, histories like ( , , )AR F AA  
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 In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the constituent game, unfair division takes 
place, with j accepting both i’s offers. 
Figure 10 shows the two possible versions of the UG with confirmed proposals. Figures 10.a 
refers to the case in which the proposer in the constituent game moves first. Figure 10.b shows the 
version with the responder in the constituent game being the first mover in the UG with confirmed 
proposals. In both figures, each tree branch marked in bold indicates a partial history inside the 
equilibrium path. Recall that the first of the two payoffs always refers to player i, as in the 
constituent game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. UG with confirmed proposals, with i (Figure 10.a) or j (Figure 10.b) as first mover. 
 
 For both GCP in Figure 10, the following result holds. 
 Proposition 5. The UG with chained confirmed proposals has infinite subgame perfect 
equilibria, leading to two payoff-equivalent confirmed agreements, which involve the egalitarian 
outcome. 
 Proof. The proof is similar for the two versions of the GCP. Consider the first version of the 
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agreement ( , )U AA  or ( , )U RA . In fact, if she proposed an unfair offer, j would reply with a 
proposal not incorporating the acceptance of U ( AR  or RR ), otherwise i would confirm U in the 
subsequent stage. Therefore, in every subgame after i has proposed U, j would never propose AA  
or RA . Then, both after history ˆ(..., , , )tjs U AR  with  ˆ 
t
js AR  and after (..., , , )
t
js U RR  with ,
t
js RR
i would propose F, otherwise she would confirm j’s rejection of her unfair offer. Then, after 
ˆ(..., , , , )tjs U AR F  with ˆ 
t
js AR , j would propose AR , thus confirming his most preferred agreement 
( , )F AR ; after (..., , , , )tjs U RR F  with 
t
js RR ,  j would never propose RR , because that would lead 
to confirm an agreement involving the rejection of i’s fair offer. This explains why whenever the 
agreement is confirmed by j in a stage 3t , the sequence of the last four proposals of the terminal 
histories is always   U AR F AR . Moreover, player j is always able to avoid confirming the 
agreements ( , )U RR  and ( , )U AR . In fact, after each history (..., , )RR U , he would propose strategy 
AR , thus avoiding to confirm the agreement ( , )U RR  or to give player i the possibility to confirm 
( , )U AA  or ( , )U RA  in the subsequent stage; after each history (..., , )AR U , he would propose RR , 
thus avoiding to confirm the agreement ( , )U AR  or to give player i the possibility to confirm 
( , )U AA  or ( , )U RA  in the subsequent stage. All the previous considerations about player j’s 
optimal behavior after stage 4 in the GCP in Figure 10.a and after stage 3 in the GCP in Figure 10.b 
explain why after every sequence of proposals ( , , , )tjF s U RR  with , ,
t
js AA AR RA , some 
equilibrium loops can emerge, thus leading to an infinite number of equilibrium terminal histories, 
all ending with player j’s confirmation of the agreement ( , )F AR  (through the final sequence of 
proposals   U AR F AR ) or with by player i’s confirmation of the agreement ( , )F Ax , with 
,x A R . This follows from the fact that player i knows that she could never obtain the confirmation 
of an agreement which would impose player j to accept an unfair offer. Therefore, whenever she has 
to choose between continuing the game through the terminal sub-history ( , , , )U AR F AR  and 
confirming an agreement ( , )F Ax , with ,x A R , she is indifferent according to condition (2.2) (see 
proof of Proposition 3): both agreements allow player i to get her second highest payoff possible 
and player j to get his highest payoff possible. ■  
Therefore, there is an infinite number of subgame perfect equilibria. In each GCP in Figure 
10 we indicated the unique equilibrium terminal history leading to confirm the agreement ( , )F AA  
in stage 3 and two among the infinite possible histories leading to confirm the agreement ( , )F AR  
in a stage 3t . Both kinds of agreements lead to a fair division. 
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 Quite surprisingly, the equilibrium agreements of the confirmed proposals version of the UG 
satisfy the same features (i) – (viii) characterizing the equilibria in the EG with confirmed 
proposals. In this regard, note also the strong similarity between the subgame perfect equilibrium 
paths of TG with confirmed proposals in Figure 6.a and those of the PD with confirmed proposals 
in Figure 2. The same holds for the EG with confirmed proposals in Figure 8.a and the BS with 
confirmed proposals in Figure 4. Finally, for the three GCP in Figure 4 (BS), 8.a (EG) and 10.a 
(UG) it is common that a first-mover disadvantage exists, while instead the relative constituent 
games are characterized by a first-mover advantage. 
 All these results suggest that the confirmed proposal mechanism works in the same way for 
dynamic constituent games with different strategic structures. 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
Throughout the paper, we have defined Games with Confirmed Proposals (GCP) and shown their 
effect on agents’ ability to coordinate on Pareto efficient outcomes even in cases in which they are 
not equilibrium outcomes of the constituent non-cooperative game. Our focus was on a confirmed 
proposal mechanism with a chain requiring that each non-confirmed strategy profile becomes the 
starting point for the next negotiation round. One could discuss the implications of breaking this 
chain on the main features of the confirmed proposal mechanism. We leave this for future research. 
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